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Abstract
We study the effect of adversarial perturbations of im-
ages on the estimates of disparity by deep learning mod-
els trained for stereo. We show that imperceptible addi-
tive perturbations can significantly alter the disparity map,
and correspondingly the perceived geometry of the scene.
These perturbations not only affect the specific model they
are crafted for, but transfer to models with different archi-
tecture, trained with different loss functions. We show that,
when used for adversarial data augmentation, our pertur-
bations result in trained models that are more robust, with-
out sacrificing overall accuracy of the model. This is un-
like what has been observed in image classification, where
adding the perturbed images to the training set makes the
model less vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, but to
the detriment of overall accuracy. We test our method using
the most recent stereo networks and evaluate their perfor-
mance on public benchmark datasets.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks are seen as fragile, in the sense
that small perturbations of their input, for example an im-
age, can cause a large change in the output, for instance the
inferred class of objects in the scene [18] or its depth map
[27]. This is not too surprising, since there are infinitely
many scenes that are consistent with the given image, so
at inference time one has to rely on the complex relation
between that image and different scenes portrayed in the
training set. This is not the case for stereo: Under mild
assumptions discussed below, a depth map can be uniquely
inferred point-wise from two images. There is no need to
learn stereo, as the images of a particular scene are suf-
ficient to infer its depth without relying on images of dif-
: denotes authors with equal contributions.
ferent scenes. (The reason we do use learning is to regu-
larize the reconstruction where the assumptions mentioned
below are violated, for instance in regions of homogeneous
reflectance.) It would therefore be surprising if one could
perturb the images in a way that forces the model to over-
rule the evidence and alter the perceived depth map, espe-
cially if such perturbations affect regions of non-uniform
reflectance. In this paper, we show that this can be done
and refer to this phenomenon as stereopagnosia, a geomet-
ric analogue of prosopagnosia [2].
Specifically, we consider stereo networks, that are func-
tions that take as input a calibrated stereo pair and produce a
depth map as output.1 Equivalently, the network can output
disparity, the displacement between corresponding points
in the two images, from which depth can be computed in
closed form. Wherever a point in the scene is supported on a
surface that is Lambertian, locally smooth, seen under con-
stant illumination, co-visible from both images, and sport-
ing a sufficiently exciting reflectance,2 its distance from the
images can be computed in closed-form [14]. Where such
assumptions are violated, disparity is either not defined, for
instance in occluded regions that are visible from one image
but not the other, or ill-posed – such as in regions with con-
stant reflectance where any disparity is equally valid (the
so-called “aperture problem”). To impute disparity to these
regions, regularization can be either generic (e.g., minimal-
surface assumptions [9]) or data-driven, exploiting known
relations between stereo pairs and disparity in scenes other
than the one in question. This is where stereo networks
1A stereo pair consists of two images captured by cameras in known
relative configuration (position and orientation), with non-zero parallax
(distance between the optical centers), projectively rectified so that cor-
responding points (points in the two image planes whose pre-image under
perspective projections intersect in space) lie on corresponding scan-lines.
A depth map is a function that associates to each pixel in a rectified image
a positive real number corresponding to the distance of the point of first
intersection in the scene from the optical center.
2There exist region statistics that exhibit isolated extrema, so the region
around the point is “distinctive” [13].
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
10
14
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
1 S
ep
 20
20
come in.
Our first contribution is to show that stereo networks are
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which are small
additive changes in the input stereo pair (either in image
one or both), designed for a specific image pair in a way
that maximally changes the output of a specific trained deep
network model. The fact that it is possible to alter the dis-
parity, even in regions that satisfy the assumptions discussed
above (Fig. 3), where disparity is uniquely defined and com-
putable in closed form, is surprising since the network is
forced to ignore the evidence, rather than simply exploit the
unbounded hypothesis space available in an ill-posed prob-
lem.
The second contribution is to show that, despite being
crafted for a specific model, the perturbations can affect the
behavior of other models, with different network architec-
ture, trained with different loss functions and optimization
methods. However, transferability is not symmetric, for in-
stance perturbations constructed for AANet [31] can wreak
havoc if used with DeepPruner [5], but not vice-versa. Mod-
els that incorporate explicit matching, such as correlation,
are more robust than those that are agnostic to the mechan-
ics of correspondence, and are instead based on stacking
generic features.
Our third contribution is more constructive, and estab-
lishes that adversarial perturbations can be used to benefi-
cial effects by augmenting the dataset and function as regu-
larizers. Unlike in single-image classification and monocu-
lar depth perception where such regularization trades off ro-
bustness to perturbations with overall accuracy, in our case
we obtain models that are more robust while retaining the
performance of the original model.
To achieve these results, we extend the Fast Gradient
Sign Method [7] and its iterative versions [4, 12], devel-
oped for for single frame classification, to two-frame stereo
disparity estimation.
2. Related Works
Adversarial Perturbations [25] have been extensively
studied for classification [7, 25] with many iterative meth-
ods to boost the effectiveness of the attacks [4, 12, 18]. [17]
further extended the attacks to the universal setting, where
the same perturbations can be added to each image in a
dataset to fool a network; [21] showed that unrecognizable
noise can result in high confidence predictions. To defend
against such attacks, [12, 26] proposed training with adver-
sarial data augmentation and [28] improved it with random-
ization.
Recently, [20] studied transferability of perturbations
across datasets and models and [30] improved transferabil-
ity across networks by deforming the image. [23] demon-
strated lower bounds on the magnitudes of perturbations
needed to fool a network and [10] showed that the existence
of adversarial perturbations can be attributed to non-robust
features.
While there are many adversarial works on classification,
there exist only a few for dense-pixel prediction tasks (e.g.
semantic segmentation, depth, optical flow). [29] designed
attacks for detection and segmentation. [8] demonstrated
targeted universal attacks for semantic segmentation, where
the network is fooled to predict a specific target. [27] used
targeted attacks to provide explainability for single image
depth prediction networks; whereas [3] probed them by in-
serting vehicles of different sizes and various objects into
different regions of the input images to see the how object
type, size and location affect the output. [19] examined uni-
versal attacks for segmentation and single image depth. [24]
studied patch attacks for optical flow.
Unlike [19, 27], we study non-targeted adversarial per-
turbations for stereo matching. While [24] also use multi-
ple frames, they apply the same visible patch to the same
locations in both images, whereas our attacks are visually
imperceptible and crafted separately for each image.
Deep Stereo Matching [32, 33] leveraged deep net-
works to extract features and perform matching separately.
Recent works implement the entire stereo pipeline as net-
work layers trained end-to-end. [15] used correlation layers
to create a 2D cost volume. [22] extended [15] to a cascade
residual learning framework. AANet [31] also used corre-
lation, but instead introduced adaptive sampling to replace
convolutions when performing cost aggregation to avoid
sampling at discontinuities. [11] proposed to concatenate
features together to build a 3D cost volume for perform-
ing cost aggregation. PSMNet [1] added spatial pyramid
pooling layers and introduced a stacked hourglass architec-
ture. DeepPruner [5] followed the 3D cost volume architec-
tures proposed by [1, 11] and proposed differentiable patch
matching over deep features to construct a sparse 3D cost
volume.
In this work, we consider adversaries for PSMNet [1],
DeepPruner [5] and AANet [31]. Since DeepPruner builds
their differentiable patch matching on top of PSMNet,
PSMNet serves as a baseline. Unlike PSMNet and Deep-
Pruner, AANet uses correlation layers for matching. In
choosing these methods, we (i) examine their individual ro-
bustness against adversaries (Sec. 5), (ii) study the trans-
ferability of perturbations between similar and different ar-
chitectures (Sec. 6), and (iii) apply defenses to increase ro-
bustness against adversaries (Sec. 7). To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to study adversarial perturba-
tions for stereo. As mentioned in the introduction, it is not a
given that adversarial perturbations, known to exist for sin-
gle image reconstruction, would exist for stereo, where the
geometry of the scene is uniquely determined from the data,
at least in the regions that satisfy the unique correspondence
assumptions.
Figure 1: Attacks on stereo models. (a) Gaussian (G) and uniform (U) noise with various upper norms () are added to input
images as a naive attack. All methods are robust to both as performances across  are approximately constant. (b) Even
with a single optimization step, FGSM with  “ 0.02 is able increase error of PSMNet from «3% to «97%. (c, d) Iterative
methods (I-FGSM, MI-FGSM) are able to further degrade performance, increasing error of AANet from «1% to «87% and
as much as 100% for PSMNet and DeepPruner. AANet is consistently more robust to adversarial noise than PSMNet and
DeepPruner.
Figure 2: FGSM with upper norms of 0.002 and 0.02. With
visually imperceptible noise,  “ 0.002, PSMNet is fooled
to predict much larger disparities (closer depths) in the top
left corner region. Using  “ 0.02, the perturbations corrupt
the geometry of the entire scene.
3. Generating Adversarial Perturbations
Given a pretrained stereo network fθpxL, xRq that pre-
dicts the disparity between the left xL and right xR im-
ages of a stereo pair, our goal is to craft perturbations
vL, vR P RHˆWˆ3, such that when added to pxL, xRq,
fθpxL, xRq ‰ fθpxL ` vL, xR ` vRq. To ensure that the
perturbations are visually imperceptible, we subject them
to the norm constraints }vI}8 ď  for I P tL,Ru. To
demonstrate such perturbations exist, we extend white-box
methods Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7], iterative-
FGSM (I-FGSM) [12], and its momentum variant (MI-
FGSM) [4], originally for classification, to the stereo match-
ing task. We note that it is also possible to perturb only one
of the two images (e.g. let vL “ 0 or vR “ 0); the effect is
less pronounced, but nonetheless present and shown in the
Supp. Mat.
FGSM. Assuming access to the network fθ and its loss
function `pfθpxL, xRq, ygtq, the perturbations for the left
and right images are computed as the sign of gradient with
respect to the images separately:
vI “  ¨ signp∇xI `pfθpxL, xRq, ygtq, (1)
where ygt P RHˆW` is the groundtruth and I P tL,Ru.
I-FGSM. To craft perturbations vL and vR for the stereo
pair xL and xR using iterative FGSM, we begin with v0L “
0 and v0R “ 0 and accumulate the sign of gradient with
respect to each image for N steps:
gn`1I “ ∇xI `pfθpxL ` vnL, xR ` vnRq, ygtq, (2)
vn`1I “ clip
`
α ¨ signpgn`1I q,´, 
˘
, (3)
where n is the step, α is the step size and the clipp¨,´, q
operation sets any value less than ´ to ´ and any value
larger than  to . The output perturbation is obtained after
the N -th step, vL “ vNL and vR “ vNR .
MI-FGSM. To leverage gradients from previous steps,
we follow [4] and replace the gradients (Eqn. 2) with nor-
malized gradients and a momentum term weighted by a pos-
itive scalar β for N steps:
gn`1I “
∇xI `pfθpxL ` vnL, xR ` vnRq, ygtq
}∇xI `pfθpxL ` vnL, xR ` vnRq, ygtq}1
, (4)
mn`1I “ β ¨mnI ` p1´ βq ¨ gn`1I , (5)
vn`1I “ clip
`
α ¨ signpmn`1I q,´, 
˘
, (6)
where m0I “ 0, vL “ vNL , and vR “ vNR .
Besides crafting perturbations for specific models, we
also study their transferability to different models. To this
end, we take pxL ` vL, xR ` vRq optimized for one model
(e.g. PSMNet) and feed it as input to another (e.g. AANet).
However, while iterative methods (I-FGSM, MI-FGSM) are
more effective than FGSM at corrupting the target model,
their perturbations are unlikely to transfer across models be-
cause they tend to overfit to the target model. To increase
the transferability across models, we leverage diverse inputs
[30] as data augmentation when crafting perturbations using
I-FGSM and MI-FGSM.
DI2-FGSM and MDI2-FGSM. Diverse inputs (DI) for
iterative methods aims to reduce overfitting by randomly
resizing the input images by a factor of h P rhmin, hmaxs
in height and w P rwmin, wmaxs in width with probability
p. To maintain the original resolution, the inputs are ran-
domly padded with zeros on each side such that the total
padding along the height is pH´h ¨Hq and along the width
pW ´ w ¨ W q, respectively. We denote this procedure as
φpx, h, wq. However, unlike [30], where the transformed
image maps to a single class label, ground-truth disparity
ygt is dense or semi-dense, so a matching transformation
must be applied to ygt. Moreover, the scale of ygt also needs
to be adjusted with respect to the resized width pw ¨ W q
of the image. Hence, we extend diverse inputs to support
stereo networks by:
xˆI “ φpxI , h, wq, (7)
vˆI “ φpvI , h, wq, (8)
yˆgt “ w ¨ φpygt, h, wq (9)
To incorporate this into iterative methods, we modify their
respective gradient computations, gn`1I . For I-FGSM, we
can re-write Eqn. 2 as:
gn`1I “ ∇xˆI `pfθpxˆL ` vˆnL, xˆR ` vˆnRq, yˆgtq, (10)
Similarly, for MI-FGSM, we can modify Eqn. 4 to be:
gn`1I “
∇xˆI `pfθpxˆL ` vˆnL, xˆR ` vˆnRq, yˆgtq
}∇xˆI `pfθpxˆL ` vˆnL, xˆR ` vˆnRq, yˆgtq}1
. (11)
To evaluate the robustness of stereo networks, we use
the official KITTI D1-all (the average number of erroneous
pixels in terms of disparity and end-point error) metric:
δpi, jq “ |fθp¨qpi, jq ´ ygtpi, jq|, (12)
dpi, jq “
#
1 if δpi, jq ą 3, δpi,jqygtpi,jq ą 5%,
0 otherwise
(13)
D1-all “ 1}Ωgt}
ÿ
i,jPΩgt
dpi, jq, (14)
where Ωgt is a subset of the image space Ω with valid
ground-truth disparity annotations, ygt ą 0.
4. Experiment Setup
Datasets. We evaluate adversarial perturbations (ro-
bustness, transferability, defense) for recent stereo methods
(PSMNet, DeepPruner, AANet) on the standard benchmark
datasets: KITTI 2015 stereo [16] validation set in the main
paper and KITTI 2012 [6] validation set in the Supp. Mat.
KITTI 2015 is comprised of 200 training stereo pairs and
KITTI 2012 consists of 194 (all at 376 ˆ 1240 resolution)
with ground-truth disparities obtained using LiDAR for out-
door driving scenes. Following KITTI validation protocol,
the KITTI 2015 training set is divided into 160 for train-
ing and 40 for validation, and the KITTI 2012 training set
is split into 160 for training and 34 for validation. Due
to computational limitations, we downsampled all images
to 256 ˆ 640; hence, there are slight increases in errors
(Eqn. 14) compared to those reported by baseline methods.
Hyper-parameters. We study perturbations under four
different upper norms,  “ t0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.002u.
 “ 0.002 is where adversaries have little effect on the net-
works and  “ 0.02 is the norm needed to achieve 100%
errors on benchmark datasets. When optimizing with I-
FGSM and DI2-FGSM, we used N “ 40 and α “ 1{N ¨ 
for  “ t0.01, 0.005, 0.002u and α “ 0.10 for  “ 0.02.
For MI-FGSM and MDI2-FGSM, α “ 1{N ¨  for all  and
chose β “ 0.47 for momentum. More details on hyper-
parameters and run-time can be found in Supp. Mat.
5. Attacking Stereo Networks
We begin with naive attacks on stereo networks (PSM-
Net, DeepPruner, AANet) by perturbing the input stereo
pair pxL, xRq with Gaussian N p0, p{4q2q and uniform
Up´, q noise for  P t0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.002u. Fig. 1-(a)
shows that such noise cannot degrade performance as the
measured error stayed approximately constant under vari-
ous . This demonstrates that the deep features extracted for
matching are robust to random noises and fooling a stereo
network requires non-trivial perturbations. Hence, we ex-
amine the robustness of stereo networks against perturba-
tions specifically optimized for each network using our vari-
ants of FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM (Sec. 3).
FGSM. Fig. 1-(a) shows errors after attacking the net-
works with FGSM (Eqn. 1) where perturbations are op-
timized over a single time step. For large upper norm
 “ 0.02, the perturbations can degrade performance sig-
nificantly – from 1.33% (AANet), 1.15% (DeepPruner)
and 3.27% (PSMNet) mean error to 42.09%, 59.86%, and
97.33%, respectively. The larger the upper norm, the more
potent the attack, but even with small  “ 0.002, this at-
tack can still increase AANet to 4.18% error, DeepPruner
to 5.93%, and PSMNet to 38.11%. Fig. 2 shows a com-
parison of FGSM attacks on PSMNet using upper norms of
0.002 and 0.02. For  “ 0.002, most of the damage is lo-
Figure 3: I-FGSM and MI-FGSM on PSMNet. For  “ 0.02, I-FGSM and MI-FGSM can degrade performance much
more than FGSM with much smaller perturbation magnitudes. Unlike Fig. 2 where most of the changes in disparity were
concentrated on low-texture regions (no disparity signal and the perturbation drives the matching), here the perturbations
degrades high texture regions. Still, the shapes of salient objects (e.g. car, human) seem to be preserved (although their
disparities are altered).
Figure 4: Transferability. Images with added adversarial perturbation optimized for various models using (a) FGSM, (b) I-
FGSM and DI2-FGSM, and (c) I-FGSM and MDI2-FGSM are fed as input to a target model. Transferability is not symmetric.
Perturbations crafted for AANet transfer the best. AANet is also the most robust against perturbations from other models.
calized (e.g. top left region of image space); whereas for
 “ 0.02, the entire predicted scene is corrupted.
I-FGSM, MI-FGSM. Fig. 1-(b, c) shows that I-FGSM
and MI-FGSM both affect performance similarly. Because
of the multiple optimization steps, when  “ 0.02, even
the more robust AANet succumbs to the attacks – increas-
ing error to «87%. For PSMNet and DeepPruner, both I-
FGSM and MI-FGSM can cause them to reach 100% er-
ror. While we cap the upper norm at , we note that itera-
tive methods are able to introduce more errors while using a
much smaller perturbation magnitude. For  “ 0.02, FGSM
achieves 97.33% error on PSMNet with }vL}1 “ 0.0569
and }vR}1 “ 0.0568; whereas, I-FGSM achieves 100% er-
ror with only }vL}1 “ 0.0213 and }vR}1 “ 0.0196 – less
than half of the L1 norm used by FGSM, making it less per-
ceptible. Fig. 3 shows examples of I-FGSM and MI-FGSM
on PSMNet. When compared to rows 4 and 5 of Fig. 2
( “ 0.02), both are less perceptible. Moreover, I-FGSM
and MI-FGSM can fool the networks in textured regions
where disparity can be obtained simplying by matching.
Interesting observations. Even though error reaches
100% for I-FGSM and MI-FGSM, the shape (albeit incor-
rect) of some salient objects like cars and human still per-
sists. This may be due to the network memorizing the gen-
eral shape of such objects. Another phenomenon is that the
noise required to perturb white regions (white walls, sky,
Fig. 2, 3) is much less than that required to attack other color
intensities. We hypothesize that this is due to white regions
being on the upper support of image intensities, which re-
sults in high activations; hence, the adversary only needs to
add small noise to adjust the activations to the needed values
to corrupt the scene. We will leave the numerical analysis
of this “white-pixel” phenomenon to future work.
Thus, stereo networks are indeed vulnerable to adversar-
ial perturbations. Each architecture exhibits different levels
of robustness against adversaries. Feature stacking (PSM-
Net) is the least robust, followed by patch-matching (Deep-
Pruner) with correlation (AANet) being the most robust.
This is because DeepPruner and AANet both find corre-
spondences based on similarity of deep features. Hence, to
fool these networks, the perturbations alter the features such
that the matching step produces incorrect correspondences.
6. Transferability Across Models
To study transferability, we (i) optimize perturbations
for PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet separately, (ii) add
each set of model-specific perturbations to the associated
input stereo pair for another model i.e. add perturbations
for PSMNet to the inputs of DeepPruner and AANet, and
(iii) measure the resulting error using Eqn. 14.
FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM. We begin with methods
studied in Sec. 5. Fig. 4-(a) shows the transferability of
FGSM from different models (red, green), for which the
perturbations were optimized, to a target model (blue). We
found that the perturbations do transfer, but with reduced
effects e.g. for  “ 0.02, perturbations optimized for Deep-
Pruner and AANet achieve 55.47% and 53.55% error on
PSMNet, respectively, while perturbations optimized for
PSMNet achieves 97.33%. The potency of the perturbations
also grows with the upper norm; hence, one can increase 
of an adversary to further degrade new models.
Fig. 4-(b) shows the transferability of I-FGSM and
Fig. 4-(c), MI-FGSM. Unlike FGSM, iterative methods
transfer much less. For instance, I-FGSM ( “ 0.02)
perturbations for DeepPruner and AANet achieve 31.20%
and 48.08%, respectively, on PSMNet; whereas, FGSM
achieves 55.47% and 53.55%, respectively. In general, it-
erative methods transfer less than FGSM because the per-
turbations tend to overfit to the model they were optimized
for. We note that AANet is the most robust against per-
turbations from other models and yet has the highest trans-
ferability, which interestingly shows that transferability is
not symmetric. While perturbations for DeepPruner and
AANet achieve 31.20% and 48.08% on PSMNet, PSMNet
and AANet achieve 13.74% and 22.25% on DeepPruner,
and those for PSMNet and DeepPruner only achieve 8.46%
and 5.81% on AANet.
DI2-FGSM, MDI2-FGSM. To increase transferability
to other stereo networks, we additionally optimized pertur-
bations using DI2-FGSM, MDI2-FGSM. Fig. 4-(b) shows
that DI2-FGSM (green) consistently degrades the target
model’s performance less than I-FGSM (blue). This is
largely due to the noise in the gradients introduced by ran-
dom resizing and padding. Fig. 4-(c) shows that pertur-
bations from MDI2-FGSM achieve errors similar to MI-
FGSM since each iteration still retains the momentum from
previous time steps.
Fig. 4-(b, c) shows that DI2-FGSM and MDI2-FGSM
consistently transfer better to new models than I-FGSM and
MI-FGSM (Fig. 5 for visualization). The best performing
iterative method is MDI2-FGSM, which achieves compara-
ble numbers to MI-FGSM on the model it is optimized for,
but also transfer well to new models. We note the trends
observed in I-FGSM and MI-FGSM are also observed here.
Transferability is not symmetric and AANet is yet again the
most robust with the highest transferability. Fig. 5 shows
that perturbations optimized for AANet fools DeepPruner,
but those optimized for DeepPruner have little effect on
AANet.
7. Defenses against Adversaries
We begin with a basic defense, Gaussian blur, against ad-
versaries. Fig. 6-(a) shows Gaussian blurring (3ˆ 3 kernel)
with various σ does not mitigate the effect of adversaries,
but exacerbates them – further degrading performance. In
addition, simply applying Gaussian blur on clean images
also decreases performance. Hence, we aim to learn more
robust representations by harnessing adversarial examples
to fine-tune the models. Fig. 6-(b, c, d) show the perfor-
mance of stereo methods after fine-tuning on a combination
of clean and perturbed images (using FGSM with various
). As a sanity check, we also fine-tuned on just clean im-
ages (‹) to ensure that differences are result of adversarial
examples.
Adversarial data augmentation increases robustness for
all models. For FGSM  “ 0.02, PSMNet decreases er-
ror from 97.33% (Fig. 2) to 2.74% against the adversary
it is trained on. Moreover, training on a smaller norm
Figure 5: Transferability between AANet and DeepPruner. We craft perturbation for AANet and DeepPruner using I-FGSM
and DI2-FGSM with  “ 0.02. DI2-FGSM transfers better than I-FGSM. Perturbations crafted for AANet transfer well to
DeepPruner (AANetÑDeepPruner), but those for DeepPruner have less effect on AANet (DeepPrunerÑAANet).
Figure 6: Defenses against attacks. (a) Applying Gaussian blur using various σ on perturbed (top) and clean images (bot-
tom). Gaussian blur does not destroy perturbations, but actually degrades performance for both perturbed and clean images.
Finetuning (b) PSMNet, (c) DeepPruner and (d) AANet on FGSM perturbations and defending attacks against new FGSM
adversaries with various . Fine-tuning on small  perturbations makes the model robust against both existing and new
adversaries without compromising performance on clean images.
( “ 0.002) can increase robustness against larger norm
( “ 0.02) attacks e.g. FGSM  “ 0.02 can degrade PSM-
Net to only 27.03% error. Also the models are more ro-
bust against new adversaries. For this, we attacked each
fine-tuned model and found that a new adversary (FGSM
 “ 0.02) can only degrade a PSMNet trained on FGSM
 “ 0.02 to 13.84% error and 23.74% when PSMNet is
trained on FGSM  “ 0.002. We also observe these trends
in DeepPruner and AANet (Fig. 6-(c, d)).
Contrary to findings reported in classification [7, 12],
augmenting the training set with adversarial examples have
little negative effect on performance of stereo models for
clean images. When training with  “ 0.002 (blue), perfor-
mance for PSMNet and AANet are essentially unchanged
(compared to ‹); for the largest  “ 0.02 (orange), errors
increased by «0.4%. The smaller the norm, the less it af-
fects performance on clean images. This is likely due to the
mis-match in image intensity distributions between natural
and adversarial examples. To avoid loss in performance,
one can train on  “ 0.002 and still observe the benefits
on robustness. Fig. 6-(b, c, d) shows that all models are (i)
robust to perturbations at  “ 0.002 and 0.005, (ii) compa-
rable to leveraging larger norm perturbations when facing
new adversaries, and (iii) retains original performance on
clean images.
An interesting observation: while training on larger
norms increases robustness against both existing and new
adversaries, the model generally performs worse against a
new adversary. For  “ 0.02, a fine-tuned PSMNet achieves
2.74% against the adversary it is trained on and 13.84%
against a new adversary; similarly, DeepPruner achieves
3.33% and 21.39% respectively. In contrast, when train-
ing on smaller norms ( “ 0.02), the model keeps the same
level robustness against existing and new adversaries. In
fact, both PSMNet and DeepPruner perform better against
new adversaries. For FGSM  “ 0.02, PSMNet fine-tuned
on  “ 0.002 achieves 27.03% against the existing adver-
sary and 23.74% against a new adversary; similarly, Deep-
Pruner achieves 17.99% and 13.01%, respectively. This
phenomenon is likely because the network is overfitting to
the intensity patterns of the large norm noise (also related
to the slight degrade in performance). But for small norms,
the network learns the underlying pattern without needing
to alter its decision boundaries significantly since the inten-
sity distribution is closer to natural images – resulting in
a more regularized model. Perhaps a strategy to learning
robust stereo networks is to iteratively craft various small
norm perturbations and train on them with a mixture of
clean images.
8. Discussion
Stereo networks are indeed vulnerable to adversarial per-
turbations. Unlike previous adversarial works on single im-
age depth, where an adversary can easily alter predictions
by slightly changing image intensities (since the network
learns a mapping from intensities to depth), here the ge-
ometry of the scene can be observed in co-visible regions.
Hence, it is surprising that adversarial perturbations exist
for stereo. This is likely due to perturbations altering ac-
tivation values in the feature extractor such that the results
corrupt the matching process. What is more interesting is
that, not only can these perturbations drastically alter pre-
dictions on the stereo models they are optimized for, they
can also transfer across models (although with reduced po-
tency). However, given that it is rare for a malicious agent
to have full access to a network and its loss, these attacks
are not feasible in practice. Yet, the fact they exist gives
us an opportunity to leverage them offline and train more
robust stereo networks.
Previous works in classification have demonstrated that
augmenting the training set with adversarial examples can
improve robustness, but at the expense of performance on
clean images. Yet, for stereo networks, we show that adver-
sarial augmentation can increase robustness without com-
promising performance. This is likely due to the observ-
ability of the scene geometry from images where texture is
sufficiently exciting. Even without any learning, one can es-
timate disparity simply by matching (precisely why Deep-
Pruner and AANet use it); learning serves as a regularizer,
so it is natural to use adversarially perturbed images as reg-
ularizers through data augmentation.
Our work here is just a first step. We only studied trans-
ferability across models and not datasets. We also do not
consider the universal setting, where a constant additive im-
age can degrade performance across all images within a
dataset. Computationally, crafting perturbations using it-
erative methods adds an average of «29s on top of the time
needed for forward passes; hence, they cannot be computed
in real time. Amongst our findings, we also observed the
“white-pixel” phenomenon, where very little perturbations
are needed to alter regions with white pixels. This is an
interesting phenomenon that is present across all methods.
We believe this is due to white being on the upper support
of image intensities; we leave the numerical analysis of this
to future work. While there is still much to do, we hope that
our work can lay the foundation for harnessing adversarial
perturbations to train more robust stereo models.
9. Ethical Impact
As deep learning models are widely deployed for various
tasks, adversarial examples have been treated as a threat to
the security of such applications. While demonstrating that
adversaries exist for stereo seems to add to this belief (since
stereo is widely used in autonomous agents), we want to as-
sure the reader that these perturbations cannot (and should
not) cause harm outside of the academic setting. Cameras
are not the only sensors on an autonomous agent, they are
generally equipped with range sensors as well. Hence, cor-
rupting the depth or disparity map will not cause the system
to fail since it can still obtain depth information from other
sources. Also, as mentioned in Sec. 8, crafting these pertur-
bations is computationally expensive and cannot be done in
real time. Thus, we see little opportunities for negative eth-
ical implications, but of course where there is a will there is
a way.
More importantly, we see adversarial perturbations as a
vehicle to develop better understanding of the behavior of
black-box models. By identifying the input signals to which
the output is most sensitive, we can ascertain properties of
the map, as others have recently begun doing by using them
to compute the curvature of the decision boundaries, and
therefore the fragility of the networks and the reliability of
their output.
What we want to stress in this work is that the mere ex-
istence of these perturbations tells us that there is a problem
with the robustness of stereo networks. Therefore, we treat
them as an opportunity to investigate and ultimately to im-
prove stereo models. Our findings in Sec. 7 shed light on
the benefits of harnessing adversarial examples and poten-
tial direction towards more robust representations.
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Supplementary Materials
A. Summary of Contents
In Sec. B, we discuss implementation details, hyper-
parameters, run-time requirements for crafting perturba-
tions and training with adversarial data augmentation. In
Sec. C, we show that perturbing one of the two images in a
stereo pair is sufficient (though less effective) to fool stereo
networks. In the main text, we demonstrated adversarial
attacks, transferability, and defenses on the KITTI 2015
dataset [16]; here, we repeat the experiments on the KITTI
2012 dataset [6] in Sec. D. Additionally, in Sec. E, we also
investigate whether the adversarial perturbations crafted for
a specific stereo pair is pathological by transferring them to
the stereo pair taken at the next time step. Lastly, we show
additional examples of perturbations crafted using each at-
tack discussed in Sec. 3 of the main text in Fig. 14-23.
B. Implementation Details
We implemented our approach in PyTorch and used the
publicly available code and pretrained models of PSMNet
[1], DeepPruner [5], and AANet [31]. We are unable to ob-
tain the necessary computational resources to craft adver-
sarial perturbations for each of the models on the KITTI
2012 [6] and 2015 [16] datasets at full image resolution
(376ˆ1240). Therefore, we resize the images to 256ˆ640
resolution for PSMNet and DeepPruner, and 252ˆ 636 for
AANet, when we craft adversarial perturbations. Because
of the resizing, the baseline errors we report are slightly
higher than those reported by the authors of PSMNet, Deep-
Pruner and AANet. We note that PSMNet and AANet
released separate pretrained models for KITTI 2012 and
2015, but DeepPruner released a single model trained on
both KITTI 2012 and 2015. Therefore, for our experiments
on KITTI 2012 (Sec. D), we use the KITTI 2012 mod-
els for PSMNet and AANet, and the KITTI 2012, 2015
model for DeepPruner. Additionally, DeepPruner provided
two pretrained models: DeepPruner-Best and DeepPruner-
Fast, both trained on KITTI 2012 and 2015. We used
DeepPruner-Best for all our experiments. AANet also pro-
vided two model variants: AANet and AANet+. We used
AANet for all our experiments.
Hyper-parameters. We consider perturbations for
four different upper norms  “ t0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.002u.
We show the hyper-parameters used for each perturbation
method in Table 1. We explored larger number of steps
N , but found little difference. Smaller N results in less
effectiveness.  “ 0.002 is where adversaries have little
effect on the networks and  “ 0.02 is the norm needed
to achieve 100% errors on benchmark datasets. We inves-
tigated α P r, 1N s and found that larger α for smaller 
I-FGSM MI-FGSM DI2-FGSM MDI2-FGSM
N 40
α,  “ 0.002 0.00005
α,  “ 0.005 0.000125
α,  “ 0.01 0.00025
α,  “ 0.02 0.002
β - 0.47 - 0.47
hmin - - 0.90 0.90
hmax - - 1.00 1.00
wmin - - 0.90 0.90
wmax - - 1.00 1.00
p - - 0.50 0.50
Table 1: Hyper-parameters used by iterative methods. All
iterative methods used N “ 40. We chose α “ 1{N ¨  for
 “ t0.01, 0.005, 0.002u, and α “ 0.10 for  “ 0.02 for
all methods. β “ 0.47 is only used for momentum methods.
hmin “ 0.90, hmax “ 1.00, wmin “ 0.90, wmax “ 1.00,
p “ 0.50 are only used for diversity input methods.
tend to be ineffective. This is likely because the accumu-
lated perturbations quickly saturate at a small  due to clip-
ping – additional steps nullify the effect of the perturbations.
Hence we chose α “ 1{N ¨  for  “ t0.01, 0.005, 0.002u.
Within the search range of α, we found that α “ 0.10 per-
formed the best (highest error) for  “ 0.02.
Run-time. We used an Nvidia GTX 1080Ti for our ex-
periments. Crafting perturbations using FGSM requires on
average «0.87s in addition to the time needed for a for-
ward pass through the stereo model (PSMNet, DeepPruner,
AANet). I-FGSM on average requires an extra«29.68s and
MI-FGSM requires «32.23s more. DI2-FGSM and MDI2-
FGSM on average requires «30.78s and «33.16s, respec-
tively, in addition to the time need for a forward pass. As
mentioned in the main text, while these perturbations can
degrade performance and also transfer to other models, they
cannot be crafted in real time. Hence, in this work we focus
on leverage to learn more robust stereo networks through
adversarial data augmentation.
Training. For defending against adversaries, we fine-
tuned the models on a combination of clean and perturbed
images (using FGSM with various ). We used 160 images
(and their perturbed versions) from the KITTI 2015 train-
ing set for fine-tuning, and the remaining 40 stereo pairs
(and their perturbed versions) for the validation set. A sim-
ilar distribution was used for experiments on KITTI 2012
dataset as well (34 stereo pairs instead of 40). All images
(clean and perturbed) were resized to 256ˆ 640 resolution.
PSMNet and DeepPruner took a 256ˆ 512 crop of the im-
age during training, while AANet took a 252 ˆ 636 crop
of the image. We chose a learning rate of 0.001 for PSM-
Figure 7: Comparison between attacking both images and attacking just one of the two images. We provide quantitative
comparisons on the KITTI 2015 dataset. Blue curve shows the error when attacking both images, green curve shows the
error when attacking just the left image (vR “ 0) and red curve just the right image (vL “ 0). Perturbing both images using
(a) FGSM, (b) I-FGSM, and (c) MI-FGSM is consistently more effective than perturbing just one of them. We note that
perturbing just the left image using FGSM on PSMNet yields similar results (96.98%) at  “ 0.02. I-FGSM and MI-FGSM
can also achieve over 90% error on PSMNet and DeepPruner using  “ 0.02.
Figure 8: I-FGSM attacks on stereo networks by perturbing only the left or right image. We demonstrate on the KITTI 2015
dataset that it is possible to fool a stereo network by only perturbing one of the two images in a stereo pair. Here, we attack
PSMNet using perturbations optimized with I-FGSM ( “ 0.02) with the constraint that it must be on either the left (where
vR “ 0) or right (where vL “ 0) image. Even with perturbations on one of the two images, we can still fool the network into
predicting drastically incorrect depths. Note: the shapes of salient objects (with incorrect disparities) observed in the Sec. 5,
Fig. 3 of the main text are also observed here.
Net and 0.0001 for DeepPruner and AANet after experi-
menting with smaller and larger learning rates. We did not
use pseudo ground truth supervision in AANet during fine-
tuning. We fine-tuned the models for 150 epochs.
Figure 9: Qualitative examples of FGSM and I-FGSM attacks on stereo networks using stereo pairs from the KITTI 2012
dataset. On the left, we show an FGSM attack on DeepPruner using  “ 0.02. The perturbations mainly corrupted the right
side of the output scene. On the right, we show an I-FGSM attack on AANet using  “ 0.02. Unlike the FGSM attack, which
tends to be localized, the I-FGSM attack corrupts the entire scene.
Figure 10: Attacking stereo networks. Results of feeding stereo pairs from KITTI 2012 dataset with added adversarial
perturbations crafted from (a) FGSM, (b) I-FGSM, and (c) MI-FGSM to PSMNet (blue), DeepPruner (green) and AANet
(red). All three attacks are able to degrade the performance of all stereo methods. Iterative methods are able to achieve
«100% error for PSMNet and DeepPruner. Similar to the results demonstrated in KITTI 2015, PSMNet is the least robust,
followed by DeepPruner, with AANet being the most robust.
C. Attacking Only One Image
In Sec. 3 of the main text, we mentioned that, while we
are able to fool stereo networks by introducing perturba-
tions to both images in the stereo pair, it is also possible to
fool them simply by perturbing just one of them (either the
left, vR “ 0, or the right, vL “ 0, image only). Fig. 7 shows
a quantitative comparison between attacking both images
versus attacking just one of them. Surprisingly, perturbing
just one of image is sufficient to fool stereo network into
predicting incorrect disparities – although consistently with
less effectiveness than perturbing both images. At the high-
est upper norm  “ 0.02, perturbing just the left image us-
ing FGSM is enough to degrade the performance of PSM-
Net to 96.98% (note that FGSM attacks are much weaker
against DeepPruner and AANet in this setting). While for
smaller upper norms, all attacks on a single image are less
effective than attacking both images, we note that iterative
methods (I-FGSM, MI-FGSM) using  “ 0.02 can achieve
similar error percentages to attacking both images for PSM-
Net and DeepPruner. When attacking one of the two im-
ages, trends similar to those for attacking both images are
present. The larger the norm, the more effective the pertur-
bations. AANet proves to be more robust than PSMNet and
DeepPruner in this problem setting. Fig. 8 shows I-FGSM
attacks on PSMNet using  “ 0.02 where the perturbations
are only located on either the left and right images. As we
can see, the network is still fooled into predicting incor-
rect disparities. We note that the shapes of salient objects
observed in Sec. 5, Fig. 3 of the main text are also ob-
served here. While we see the shape of the vehicle on the
left panel, the disparities of the vehicle are incorrect. This
is likely due to the vehicle being co-visible and hence the
shape is observed. This also shows that the network is able
to learn general shapes of objects that exist in the scene.
D. Results on KITTI 2012
In the main paper, we showed experiments on the KITTI
2015 dataset. Here, we repeat all experiments performed
Figure 11: Investigating whether an adversarial example crafted for a specific stereo pair is pathological. As a simple
experiment, we crafted perturbations using FGSM with  “ 0.002 for PSMNet and DeepPruner for specific stereo pairs
taken at time t and transferred them to the stereo pairs taken at the next time step t ` 1. Because the perturbations tend to
be around the edges, we chose the smallest upper norm such that mis-match in edges between the stereo pairs taken at time
t and the next time step t` 1 will not cause perturbations to be visually perceptible. We found that depending on the scene,
the perturbations can transfer. For instance, if the perturbations are added onto similar structures as the previous time step,
then the effect remains intact. However, if the motion is large and the intended structures are occluded or new structures are
disoccluded in their place, then the perturbations will lose their effect. In the examples above, the predictions corresponding
to the sky and some of the vegetation are still corrupted by the perturbations crafted for the stereo pair from the previous time
step t.
on the KITTI 2015 dataset for KITTI 2012 dataset. Fig. 10
shows the effect of perturbations crafted using FGSM, I-
FGSM, and MI-FGSM and Fig. 12 demonstrates their abil-
ity to transfer across models. Fig. 9 shows representative
examples of FGSM and I-FGSM attacks on DeepPruner
and AANet, respectively. As a defense, we fine-tuned each
model on a mixture of clean and perturbed images using ad-
versarial data augmentation. Fig. 13 shows the behavior of
each fine-tuned model when attacked by the adversary they
are trained on (top row) and also when attacked by a new
adversary (bottom row).
FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM. For FGSM attacks
(Fig. 10-(a)), PSMNet proves to be the most susceptible as
perturbations with  “ 0.002 can degrade performance to
16.45% and with  “ 0.02 error increases to 86.16%. For I-
FGSM (Fig. 10-(b)), perturbations can achieve 100% error
on both PSMNet and DeepPruner using the highest upper
norm and 86.07% on AANet. Fig. 10-(c) shows perturba-
tions optimized using MI-FGSM achieves 95.95%, 97.95%,
and 66.49% on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet, respec-
tively. We show examples of FGSM and I-FGSM attacks
on DeepPruner and AANet in Fig. 9. In general, explicit
matching methods (DeepPruner and AANet) are more ro-
bust than implicit matching or feature stacking methods
(PSMNet). Overall, AANet is the most robust out of the
three stereo models evaluated.
Transferability. Fig. 12-(a) shows the transferability of
perturbations crafted by FGSM. Unlike our findings in the
transferability experiments conducted on the KITTI 2015
dataset (Fig. 4, main text), PSMNet transfers the best to
DeepPruner and AANet, matching performance for pertur-
bations optimized for DeepPruner and outperforming per-
turbations optimized for AANet. The latter is an interesting
phenomenon also observed in the KITTI 2015 dataset – per-
turbations crafted for PSMNet using FGSM are more effec-
tive than those crafted for AANet when applied to AANet.
This phenomenon is isolated to only this case and we hy-
pothesize that this is likely due to architectural similarities
in the feature extraction step (general enough to DeepPruner
and AANet, but not the other way around because Deep-
Pruner and AANet features are more specific to explicit
patch matching architecture). We leave additional analysis
on why this occurs to future work.
Fig. 12-(b) shows I-FGSM and DI2-FGSM attacks on
stereo networks. Similar to our findings in KITTI 2015, I-
FGSM perturbations crafted for a specific model are much
less effective than FGSM when transferred to another. This
is due to overfitting to the network it is optimized for. In-
put diversity improves transferability. Unlike Fig. 4-(b) in
the main text, perturbations crafted for PSMNet transfer the
best. Similar trends can be observed in Fig. 12-(c). While
AANet is still the most robust out of the three models, PSM-
Net transfers the best for KITTI 2012.
Defenses. To defend against adversarial attacks on
stereo networks, we propose to use adversarial data aug-
mentation and fine-tune each stereo model on a mixture
of clean and adversarially perturbed (using FGSM) images.
Fig. 13 shows the errors of each stereo method, after fine-
tuning on an adversary of a specific upper norm, when
attacked by adversaries optimized for the original model
(top row) and by new adveraries optimized for the fine-
tuned model (bottom row). As a sanity check to ensure
that any performance difference is due to the adversarial
data augmentation, we also fine-tuned each method on the
clean data (denoted as ‹). Fig. 13 shows that after train-
ing on a mixture of clean and adversarial perturbed images,
all methods are now more robust against the adversary de-
signed for the original model. Moreover, all methods are
also more robust against new adversaries. Unlike findings
reported in adversarial works in classification, training on
adversarial examples does not compromise performance on
clean images when using smaller norm ( P t0.002, 0.005u)
perturbations; when training on larger norm perturbations
( P t0.01, 0.02u), performance only degrades slightly (per-
formance of all methods on clean images is very close to
‹ in Fig. 13), where the change in error is «0.4%. This is
likely due to the observability of 3D from the input stereo
pair e.g. one does not need to learn stereo, classic match-
ing methods can estimate disparity without any learning.
Hence, the adversarial examples serve as regularization. We
note while the change in performance for larger norm is
small, it is nonetheless performance degradation; we hy-
pothesize that this is due to the mis-match in intensity dis-
tribution between the clean and perturbed images.
E. Transferring Perturbations to Next Frame
To investigate whether or not the adversarial perturba-
tions crafted for a specific stereo pair is pathological – in
that they can only do damage to the stereo pair that they
are optimized for, we perform a simple experiment of trans-
ferring (adding) the perturbations crafted for a stereo pair
at time step t to the temporally adjacent stereo pair at time
step t ` 1. Because groundtruth disparity is not available
for stereo pairs taken at time t ` 1, we only evaluate this
section qualitatively in Fig. 11. Fig. 11 shows examples of
stereo pairs at time t ` 1 with added perturbations crafted
the stereo pair at time t, and the predictions for the images
taken at t` 1 – before and after adding the perturbations.
Fig. 11 shows that the perturbations have the ability to
transfer to the frames taken at the next time step; however,
it depends on the structures in the scene. For this experi-
ment, we crafted FGSM perturbations for PSMNet, Deep-
Pruner and AANet using the smallest norm  “ 0.002. Be-
cause the perturbations tend to concentrate around edges,
we chose the smallest upper norm such that mis-match in
edges between the stereo pair at time t and the next time step
t` 1 will not cause perturbations to be visually perceptible.
We found that depending on the scene, the perturbations
can transfer. For instance, if the perturbations are added
onto similar structures that are present in the previous time
step, then the effect remains intact. However, if the mo-
tion is large and the intended structures are occluded or new
structures are disoccluded, then it loses the effect. Fig. 11
demonstrates this phenomenon. The predictions for the sky
and some of the vegetation regions are still corrupted by
the perturbations crafted for the stereo pair from the previ-
ous time step. Based on our observations, we do not expect
the perturbations optimized for one stereo pair to retain the
same effect on a stereo network when added to a different
stereo pair of a different scene.
F. Additional Examples
In the main text, we have primarily shown examples of
perturbations with upper norms  P t0.002, 0.02u (smallest
and largest norms considered) crafted using various meth-
ods. Fig. 14 to 23 show examples of attacks on PSMNet,
DeepPruner, and AANet using  P t0.005, 0.01u. Fig. 14
and 17 compare FGSM attacks for the two norms on the
same stereo pairs, Fig. 14 and 17 compare I-FGSM attacks,
Fig. 18 and 19 compare MI-FGSM attacks, Fig. 20 and 21
compare DI2-FGSM attacks and lastly, Fig. 22 and 23 com-
pare MDI2-FGSM attacks. Increasing the upper norm from
0.005 to 0.01 does not make the perturbations visible; how-
ever, it does increase the effect of perturbations to fool the
stereo networks into predicting drastically different scenes.
Figure 12: Transferability. Adversarial perturbations optimized for various models using (a) FGSM, (b) I-FGSM and DI2-
FGSM, and (c) MI-FGSM and MDI2-FGSM are added to stereo pairs from the KITTI 2012 dataset and fed as input to a
target model. Similar to our findings in the KITTI 2015 dataset, AANet is generally the most robust against perturbations
from other models, with the exception of FGSM where perturbations optimized for PSMNet performs better those optimized
for AANet. Perturbations crafted using momentum methods transfer the best. Transferability between models is, again, not
symmetric. However, unlike the results in KITTI 2015, perturbations crafted for PSMNet tend to transfer the best.
Figure 13: Training with adversarial data augmentation. Finetuning (a) PSMNet, (b) DeepPruner and (c) AANet on FGSM
perturbations and defending attacks against existing (top row) and new (bottom row) FGSM adversaries with various . Fine-
tuning on small  perturbations makes the model robust against both existing and new adversaries without compromising
performance on clean images. ‹ denotes performance of training on only clean images.
Figure 14: Examples of FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.005.
Figure 15: Examples of FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.01.
Figure 16: Examples of I-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.005.
Figure 17: Examples of I-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.01.
Figure 18: Examples of MI-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.005.
Figure 19: Examples of MI-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.01.
Figure 20: Examples of DI2-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.005.
Figure 21: Examples of DI2-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.01.
Figure 22: Examples of MDI2-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.005.
Figure 23: Examples of MDI2-FGSM attacks on PSMNet, DeepPruner and AANet using  “ 0.01.
